World
Pakistan’s Middle‑Power Ambitions Hampered by Weak Economy

In a world moving from unipolarity to fragmented multipolarity, middle powers act as diplomatic bridges and economic stabilisers, preventing a full split between Washington and Beijing. Scholars assess middle‑power status on military capability, diplomatic outreach, and national strength, the latter defined by sustainable economic vitality and technological adaptation.
Over the past two years, Pakistan has strengthened its military and diplomatic standing. Between 2025 and 2026, it showcased hard‑power credentials through high‑intensity deterrence and institutionalised defence partnerships. A four‑day conflict with India in May 2025 saw Pakistan launch Operation Bunyanum Marsoos, demonstrating modern warfare capabilities and aerial superiority. The rapid White House‑facilitated ceasefire on May 10 limited a larger neighbour’s unilateral escalation dominance and reinforced Islamabad’s conventional and strategic deterrence.
Since that confrontation, Pakistan has expanded its security network. In September 2025 it signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Riyadh, and in August 2026 it joined Saudi Arabia and Türkiye in the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement. The Badr agreement with Türkiye, Qatar, and Indonesia further positioned Pakistan as a net security provider for Arab Gulf states.
Diplomatically, Pakistan has played a niche role. After the outbreak of direct US‑Israeli hostilities against Iran in early 2026, Islamabad adopted an active neutral stance. In March 2026 the US accepted Pakistan as a conduit to Tehran, leading to historic Islamabad peace talks in April and a June Memorandum of Understanding that temporarily reopened the Strait of Hormuz. Pakistan also joined Trump’s Gaza peace plan as a founding member.
However, Pakistan’s economic foundation remains weak. Fiscal year 2025‑26 showed inflation between 7‑9 % and GDP growth of 3.7 %, but investment sits near 15 % of GDP, below the 20 % threshold needed to sustain 6 % growth rates for a large youth population. Deindustrialisation, high energy costs, and security concerns in Balochistan, KP, and AJK deter foreign investment. The privatisation process is slow, political consensus on reforms for new provinces is lacking, and the tax‑to‑GDP ratio is low. Heavy external debt servicing and reliance on remittances, multilateral bailouts, and bilateral rollovers (including a $3 billion Saudi cash deposit in April 2026) keep state solvency fragile.
Thus, Pakistan exemplifies an asymmetric emerging middle power: a disciplined military and seasoned diplomatic corps that have leveraged regional crises for high‑stakes global influence, yet lack the economic autonomy and technological innovation to sustain that influence. To solidify its middle‑power status, Pakistan must undertake an urgent domestic pivot—dismantling elite economic capture, broadening the tax base, overhauling education to build a tech‑literate workforce, and enhancing an export‑driven industrial base. Until its economic sovereignty matches its battlefield deterrence and diplomatic agility, Pakistan’s middle‑power aspirations remain precarious.
The writer is a strategic analyst of international security. The views expressed are his own. Published in Dawn, November 15 , 2026
Frequently asked questions
What was Pakistan's inflation rate during fiscal year 2025‑26?
Inflation ranged between 7‑9 %.
Which defense agreements did Pakistan sign with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye?
In September 2025 Pakistan signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Riyadh, and in August 2026 it joined Saudi Arabia and Türkiye in the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement.
What was the result of the 2025 conflict with India?
Pakistan launched Operation Bunyanum Marsoos, demonstrated aerial superiority, and a White House‑facilitated ceasefire on May 10 limited escalation.