World
US Trade Policy Shift Highlights Africa’s Need for Self‑Reliant Integration

On September 2, President Donald Trump signed legislation extending the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) through 2028 after strong congressional support. Two months later, on November 2, his administration announced it would end South Africa’s and Rwanda’s AGOA eligibility from January 1, 2027. The move underscores AGOA’s vulnerability: African economies rely on trade privileges that Washington can withdraw when its political priorities change.
AGOA, a U.S. trade law enacted on May 18, 2000, covers 33 sub‑Saharan African countries and allows them to export thousands of products to the U.S. duty‑free. It was promoted as a tool to foster economic growth, expand U.S.–Africa trade and encourage reforms. The program has reportedly supported more than 300,000 direct jobs and 1.3 million indirect jobs across Africa. A 2024 U.S. Trade Representative report noted that two‑way goods trade between the U.S. and sub‑Saharan Africa reached $47.5 bn in 2023, including $9.7 bn in imports under AGOA and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), of which $5.5 bn were non‑oil products.
Recent data show challenges. A Congressional Research Service report shows U.S. imports receiving AGOA duty‑free treatment fell from $7.9 bn in 2024 to $5 bn in 2025. An IDOS analysis found the share of U.S. imports from sub‑Saharan Africa benefiting from AGOA and GSP preferences dropped from over 80 % in 2008 to about 24.7 % in 2021, amid eligibility uncertainty and short renewal windows.
Only a few eligible countries capture most of AGOA’s benefits. South Africa is the largest beneficiary, with exports to the U.S. worth billions annually, while most other eligible countries struggle to fully use its preferences. Because the U.S. administers the program unilaterally, Washington can exclude or reinstate any eligible country based on its own assessments, including market reforms, human rights and labour standards. Since its inception, some suspended countries have criticized the impact of their removal; for example, Ethiopia’s 2022 suspension led to the loss of thousands of garment‑sector jobs.
Washington’s geopolitical interests often outweigh AGOA’s stated criteria. The Trump administration’s decision to terminate South Africa’s and Rwanda’s eligibility reflects that trend. South Africa has strengthened ties with U.S. rivals such as China and Russia and has faced accusations of obstructing American trade and investment, while Rwanda’s alleged support for the M23 rebel group in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has conflicted with U.S. interests in the region’s critical minerals.
Sharp declines in AGOA import values, unstable U.S. trade policies and short‑term extensions leave African exporters highly vulnerable. Losing AGOA access triggers immediate customs setbacks, including tariff increases of 15‑20 % on some products. These unpredictable extensions prevent AGOA from building a self‑sustaining African industrial base, making accelerated implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) an urgent priority.
The AfCFTA, signed under the African Union on March 21, 2018 in Kigali and entering force on May 30, 2019, aims to create a unified market of over 1.3 billion people with a combined GDP exceeding $3.4 trillion. By progressively eliminating tariffs on 90 % of tariff lines, the agreement seeks to stimulate internal commerce and buffer African trade against external shocks such as the revocation of preferential agreements like AGOA.
AfCFTA has advanced several instruments: participation in trade initiatives now includes South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda and Tunisia; the Pan‑African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) launched on January 13, 2022 enables cross‑border transactions in African currencies; the African Union adopted protocols on competition policy in February 2023 and digital trade in February 2024; and in August 2026 the AfCFTA Secretariat signed an agreement to modernise and digitise customs systems. The AfCFTA Adjustment Fund has been activated, with an estimated financing requirement of $8‑10 bn to support developing countries and SMEs.
To reduce dependence on volatile global trade agreements that prioritize Western interests, Africa must accelerate economic integration by removing tariff and non‑tariff barriers, harmonising trade and regulatory policies, and investing in cross‑border infrastructure such as roads, railways and digital energy grids. Building strong regional value chains focused on local manufacturing and innovation will strengthen economic self‑sufficiency and lessen vulnerability to external political decisions and the expiration of unilateral trade agreements.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
Frequently asked questions
When was AGOA extended and until when?
President Donald Trump signed legislation on September 2 extending AGOA through 2028.
Which countries lost AGOA eligibility in 2027?
South Africa and Rwanda were announced to lose AGOA eligibility from January 1, 2027.
What is the AfCFTA and when did it enter force?
The African Continental Free Trade Area was signed on March 21, 2018, and entered force on May 30, 2019.