World
Iran’s Negotiation Power Centered on Supreme Leader’s Directives and Security Council Decisions
Negotiations to prevent a further outbreak of war between Iran and the United States are ongoing, but the stalled process has highlighted who holds power within Iran’s government. President Masoud Pezeshkian, described as a moderate, said on Monday that his government had been granted “certain powers” by Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei regarding talks with Washington, though he did not specify the authority. His remarks followed efforts by Qatar and Pakistan to deter new U.S. strikes on Iran.
The conflict, which began with U.S. and Israeli air strikes on February 28 that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior officials, has seen the balance of power shift toward the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and other security officials. "I think the key point is that any agreement must have the backing of the security‑military establishment in Iran," said Sina Toossi, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, to Al Jazeera.
Iran has presented a seven‑point plan that it demands the U.S. follow to end the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Decision‑making on the war and negotiations occurs through a concerted approach within government institutions, including the office of the Supreme Leader and the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Military and security figures are prominent in these bodies.
The Supreme Leader’s office said he met with top military commanders, including IRGC chief commander Ahmad Vahidi, to issue directives on how to respond to U.S. threats of all‑out war. Khamenei instructed Iran’s armed forces to respond immediately and without geographic restrictions, expanding their list of U.S. and Israeli targets if the war escalates.
Ultimately, the Supreme Leader decides on ending the war, but the SNSC – which includes representatives from the armed forces, government ministers, and heads of parliament and the judiciary – votes on proposals first. By law, Iran’s president heads the SNSC, but the secretary has recently held more influence due to his role as a central coordinator for national security matters. Since early August, Mohsen Rezaei, a former IRGC commander‑in‑chief who has never held public office, has occupied that position.
When U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance wrote a letter to Tehran last week, he addressed it to Rezaei, not the president or Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran’s parliament speaker who has also acted as chief negotiator in recent months. Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said Rezaei, not Ghalibaf, would respond to the letter if he chooses, but noted that Ghalibaf had not been removed from the chief negotiator role. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and his deputies, including Kazem Gharibabadi, remain key government figures maintaining contact with mediators and pursuing diplomacy through the United Nations and international bodies.
Ghalibaf steered talks that led to a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Washington in June, which briefly paused the war and lifted a maritime blockade on southern Iranian ports. The MoU collapsed after Tehran accused the U.S. of violating several provisions, including those on the Strait of Hormuz, and the IRGC launched attacks against three vessels attempting unauthorized transits. The U.S. military then escalated its own strikes on Iran, reimposed the blockade, and introduced new sanctions.
The MoU’s failure prompted discussions about power dynamics within Iran’s government. For months, media and analysts speculated about who ordered the attacks and their implications. Some U.S. media quoted sources saying hardline factions directed the attacks on shipping. In early August, Pezeshkian said he would have preferred the MoU to continue, adding that a team should have been formed to address violations rather than to fight.
In mid‑October, IRGC spokesman Hossein Mohebbi said hitting the three ships was not a rogue action and was coordinated with unspecified higher authorities. He described the attacks as a “decisive response” to U.S. violations, accusing Washington of establishing an alternative shipping route near Oman and taking other steps.
In the current mediated talks, some of Iran’s demands amount to a return to the MoU with better sequencing and additional guarantees to make a future deal last longer. Rezaei told state television that he detected a positive change in tone in the message sent by Vance, but Iran’s security chief has so far left it unanswered because Iran’s primary conditions have been clearly communicated through mediators.
Tehran seeks an end to the U.S. naval blockade, lifting of oil and other sanctions, release of frozen funds abroad, reduction of U.S. military deployment in Iran’s periphery, and a halt to fighting on all fronts, including in Lebanon. In the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian authorities have united in saying they want to enforce sovereignty and expect Washington to recognize an Iran‑Oman deal that establishes shipping routes for a partial reopening.
Decision‑makers in Tehran insist those preliminary conditions must be met before negotiations move to a next phase that would also address Iran’s nuclear programme. In a statement on Tuesday, Ali Abdollahi, chief of staff of the armed forces, said Iran’s roadmap for sustainable security includes relying on “security measures from within West Asia” as well as guarantees of non‑aggression.
Political analyst Toossi said he would not necessarily interpret the different roles of Rezaei, Ghalibaf and Pezeshkian as evidence of competing centres of power. "Rather they seem to reflect a division of responsibilities within a centrally coordinated process under Khamenei," he said.
Iran’s leaders appear determined not to repeat the perceived mistakes of previous negotiations with U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration, which made concessions or relied on U.S. assurances only to face renewed pressure and military attacks. "Tehran now wants Washington to fulfil its commitments before making concessions of its own, including on arrangements that would formalise Iran’s role in managing the Strait of Hormuz," Toossi said. "This presents a formidable obstacle, even as both sides have compelling reasons to avoid another war."
He added that Iran has offered to shorten the timeline for reopening the strait to two days, a tactical concession that does not resolve larger issues. "The real sticking point is not how quickly Hormuz reopens; it’s who controls the terms under which it stays open. Unless the two sides can bridge that fundamental disagreement, shortening the reopening timeline alone is unlikely to produce a breakthrough," Toossi said.