World

CIR Identifies 25 Sudanese Commanders Linked to Sexual Violence Amid Ongoing Conflict

By Charles Rosser

The Centre for Information Resilience (CIR) has mapped 25 commanders who were present at five sites during periods of reported sexual violence in Sudan’s war. The investigation, released on Monday, examines the presence and roles of commanders in the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) during a three‑year conflict.

On the day the RSF entered el‑Fasher in October 2025, a TikTok video showed RSF commander Khademallah Khashmin Herika, also known as Shiraz Khalid, encouraging fighters to rape women in Sudan’s Northern State. Herika, a major commanding the RSF’s female contingent, was described by CIR as having issued an explicit incitement to rape. The video was posted on October 26, 2025, though its exact filming location could not be determined. Separate footage places Herika in el‑Fasher and in Garni, where survivors reported girls being detained and raped.

CIR’s report links commanders to five locations and time periods of reported abuse, using evidence from the United Nations, rights groups and Sudanese organisations. The findings identify commanders who exercised authority where atrocities were reported, but do not establish that each personally committed or ordered acts of rape. Investigators verified identities, locations and, where possible, filming dates, with commander sightings independently confirmed by two analysts. They compared these records with survivor accounts, reported incidents, threatening rhetoric and indicators of heightened risk, such as forced separation of men and women.

The UN fact‑finding mission documented mass and gang rape during the RSF takeover of el‑Fasher, including at the Saudi Hospital and el‑Fasher University. Women and girls were also attacked along escape routes out of the city. CIR cites a survivor who described being held with other girls at soldiers’ quarters near Garni and raped over two nights, with her family’s detention for ransom delaying access to medical care.

Key commanders identified include: - Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo, deputy commander of the RSF and brother of RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). CIR verified him at the former 6th Infantry Division base on October 26 and at the Saudi Hospital on November 4. - Hussein Abu Jalak, artillery commander, whose voice was matched to Dagalo in drone footage from October 27. - Gedo Hamdan Ahmed (Ibn Shouk), RSF sector commander, who appeared at Zamzam displacement camp during the April 2025 assault and around el‑Fasher during its takeover. - Abuaqla Mohamed Ahmed Alwakil (Kaykal), who served as an RSF division commander in Wad Madani before defecting to the army in October 2024. CIR verified his presence in Wad Madani and Wad al‑Mehidi in January 2025, where he commanded the Sudan Shield Forces. - Major‑General Abdelmoneim Abdelbasit Mohamed, commander of the Sennar axis, identified on January 12, 2025, during the recapture of Wad Madani.

The investigation also examined abuses against Kanabi communities in Gezira, southeast of Khartoum. Verified footage from Hantoub Bridge shows fighters beating and sexually degrading a detained man before pushing him off the bridge. CIR identified insignia associated with the army‑allied Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, General Intelligence Service and Special Mission Forces.

Al Jazeera contacted the RSF and the SAF for comment on the findings but received no response. Both forces have previously denied allegations of sexual violence by their personnel.

On October 26, Britain imposed sanctions on 15 senior commanders from Sudan’s rival forces over suspected atrocities, including conflict‑related sexual violence. The sanctions include asset freezes and travel bans. Among those named were Abu Jalak and Al‑Nour Ahmed Adam (al‑Qubba), linked to the siege and assault on el‑Fasher. The UK pledged 5 million pounds for survivors’ healthcare and psychosocial support and an additional 10 million pounds for humanitarian assistance.

CIR states that while it has reasonable grounds to believe the identified commanders were directly or indirectly responsible for sexual violence, data limitations prevent attribution of individual responsibility for specific incidents. Presence, rank and repeated appearances can guide further investigation but do not alone establish criminal guilt. A command‑responsibility case would require evidence of effective control, knowledge and failures to prevent, repress or report crimes. For survivors, stigma, insecurity and inaccessible services continue to obstruct treatment and testimony. The investigation preserves the images fighters recorded themselves as another source of evidence.