Law & Justice
Michigan Court of Appeals Reopens Divorce‑Settlement Malpractice Suit

Jamie Lee Baker was entitled to $13,000 a month for 111 months from her ex‑husband Kevin Baker, secured by assignments of his membership interests in several limited‑liability companies. Kevin made only 27 payments before he died, leaving 84 payments worth more than $1 million unpaid. Baker discovered that the collateral behind the agreement may not have been what she thought it was.
On November 13 the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed a lower court’s dismissal of Baker’s legal‑malpractice lawsuit against attorney Michael A. Robbins. The ruling does not decide whether Robbins was negligent; it only finds that there are genuine material‑fact questions about whether the assignments in the divorce settlement actually provided the security Baker was promised, and remands the case for further proceedings.
The settlement promised Baker property‑settlement payments of $13,000 per month for 111 months. To protect her if Kevin stopped paying, the agreement called for assignments of his membership interests in several LLCs, including LIP GTC, LIP LIMA, LIP Auburn, LIP Cascade, LIP Hall Road Crossing Holdings, and LIP Madison. Kevin had listed 14 LLCs in which he claimed membership interests and indicated that LIP Holdings owned five of those interests. The problem was that five of the entities listed as collateral were actually owned by LIP Holdings, not by Kevin directly. Kevin held his interest in LIP Cascade directly, but he did not assign his interest in LIP Holdings itself as part of the settlement.
After the divorce was finalized, Kevin made 27 monthly payments before he died. That left 84 payments outstanding, totaling more than $1 million. Baker then tried to collect on the collateral through probate proceedings. The probate court found that the assignment of Kevin’s 80 percent interest in LIP Cascade was valid and binding, and ordered that interest to be assigned to Baker. But for the other five LLCs, the court discovered that LIP Holdings, not Kevin, owned the entities. That meant Kevin did not have personal membership interests in those companies that he could assign directly to Baker.
LIP Holdings’ operating agreement included an involuntary transfer provision. If a member’s interest was subject to an involuntary transfer, the other member, in this case the Daniel Kukes Living Trust, had the option to purchase that interest for 50 percent of its book value. The Kukes Trust argued that the probate court’s order and the underlying assignment triggered that provision. It offered $137,244 to purchase any membership interests Baker claimed to hold in the LIP entities. Baker eventually settled with the Kukes Trust for $235,000 in exchange for her purported membership interests. Even after adding $194,000 from the sale of LIP Cascade, the total she received from the collateral was less than half of what Kevin still owed under the divorce settlement.
Baker sued Robbins for legal malpractice, arguing that he failed to obtain sufficient security and collateral under the divorce settlement, failed to recognise and advise her about the consequences of the assignments, and failed to involve the Kukes Trust during the assignment process. To succeed on a legal‑malpractice claim in Michigan, Baker must show that an attorney‑client relationship existed, that Robbins was negligent, that the negligence caused her injury, and that she suffered actual damages.
The appeals court found that the trial court’s dismissal was premature because there were factual questions that needed to be resolved. The court noted that the husband had no personal membership interests in the five LIP entities, since those entities were wholly owned by LIP Holdings. It also noted that a member of an LLC has no interest in specific LLC property, which means Kevin could not simply assign the entities themselves as collateral.
The trial court had granted summary disposition, finding that Baker did receive the specific collateral she bargained for. The appeals court disagreed, saying that conclusion was based on an incorrect legal premise. The probate court’s orders recognised the LIP entities as non‑probate assets, but they did not actually assign interests in those entities by operation of law. The appeals court said those orders did not address whether Kevin had any interest in the entities in the first place, or how his interest in LIP Holdings factored into the assignments. Because Kevin had no personal membership interests in the five LIP entities, the appeals court found that the trial court erred in concluding that Baker had validly assigned any membership interests in those entities. That error meant the case could not be dismissed at that stage.
The appeals court reversed the grant of summary disposition and remanded the case for further proceedings. It noted that the lawsuit is still at an early stage, and that either party may seek summary disposition again after discovery is complete. For Baker, the ruling means her malpractice claim is alive. She can now pursue discovery and try to prove that Robbins’s handling of the settlement caused her to lose collateral that was supposed to protect her financially. For Robbins, the case is not yet decided. The appeals court did not find that he was negligent; it simply found that there were factual questions that needed to be answered before the case could be dismissed.
The case highlights the importance of knowing exactly what is being transferred as security in a divorce settlement. LLC interest is different from LLC asset, and a member cannot transfer property owned by the LLC that is not owned by the member. Operating agreements can complicate matters, and an involuntary transfer provision can limit what a former spouse can actually receive, even if an assignment is valid on paper.