World

Iran‑US Talks Shift Toward Synchronized, Verified Steps

By Ali Sari

For nearly twenty years, Iran and the United States have debated who should move first in their negotiations. The question has been whether Iran should curb its nuclear program before receiving economic relief, or whether Washington should ease pressure before expecting Iranian concessions. Recent tensions over the Strait of Hormuz have highlighted that the real issue is not who moves first, but whether both sides can move together.

Tehran has offered to reopen the waterway if Washington lifts the naval blockade, eases sanctions, and provides guarantees against renewed attacks. Tehran says negotiations cannot begin under pressure, while Washington insists that any new diplomatic process must address the nuclear issue from the outset. Both sides are demanding confidence‑building measures before taking the first step.

History shows that such dilemmas have been addressed through reciprocal action. The 2013 Joint Plan of Action between Iran and the P5+1— the five permanent UN Security Council members and Germany— was built on an interim approach in which both sides accepted limited, reversible measures. Iran agreed to restrictions on parts of its nuclear program, including limits on enrichment levels and enhanced monitoring, while the US and its partners provided limited sanctions relief. This approach evolved into the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which set a 3.67 percent enrichment cap, expanded IAEA monitoring, and provided sanctions relief in exchange for nuclear restrictions. The JCPOA was implemented in phases: the agreement in July 2015, Adoption Day in October, and Implementation Day in January 2016 after the IAEA verified Iran’s initial commitments. Only after verification did major sanctions relief begin.

The lesson is that sequencing alone is vulnerable without durable political guarantees. When the US withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and restored sanctions, Iran concluded that technical commitments were insufficient. From Iran’s perspective, the central problem became the absence of guarantees that a future agreement would survive political changes in Washington. US policymakers argue that sanctions relief must be linked to verifiable Iranian commitments, especially regarding the nuclear program, to preserve leverage.

Critics of synchronized steps warn that deep mistrust makes simultaneous implementation unrealistic. They fear Iran could use economic relief to rebuild capabilities, while Washington worries about losing its negotiating advantage. The solution, according to the article, is not to abandon reciprocity but to design stronger verification mechanisms. A workable model would link the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to a phased easing of restrictions, with each stage monitored by a third party. Qatar, as a mediator, could facilitate communication, while technical nuclear issues could remain under IAEA verification.

The principle would be that every Iranian action has a clearly defined US response, and every US step has a measurable Iranian obligation. This approach is more realistic than demanding unilateral concessions because it gives both governments political space at home. Neither side would appear to be surrendering under pressure; both could argue that they are receiving something in return.

Recent diplomacy has moved partially in this direction. A June memorandum of understanding between the US and Iran, supported by Qatar and other mediators, attempted to create mechanisms for reducing tensions, including issues related to military operations and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Later discussions included technical committees and monitoring mechanisms designed to manage implementation.

Qatar’s mediation has become increasingly significant. Doha has attempted to bridge the gap between Tehran’s demand for confidence‑building measures before negotiations and Washington’s insistence that nuclear issues remain central. The recent message from US Vice President JD Vance to Iranian officials also reflected this dilemma. Washington signaled willingness to explore renewed negotiations but insisted that the nuclear issue remain part of the discussion. Tehran, meanwhile, has continued to argue that pressure must be reduced before broader talks can succeed.

The question facing both capitals is therefore not whether compromise is possible, but whether they can design a process in which compromise becomes politically survivable. The Middle East has already paid a high price for the belief that pressure alone can produce strategic outcomes. Military escalation, economic disruption and energy uncertainty have demonstrated the limits of confrontation. The next diplomatic test will not be whether Iran or the US is willing to make the first concession. It will be whether both sides are prepared to accept a more difficult but more practical formula: not trust before action, but verified action that gradually creates trust. The future of Iran‑US diplomacy may depend on replacing the politics of the first move with the discipline of the synchronized move.