Law & Justice

Texas Appeals Court Reopens Fee Dispute for Disbarred Attorney

By TOI World Desk

A Texas appeals court on November 5, 2026, reversed a lower court’s summary judgment that had dismissed the claims of former attorney R Kent Livesay and his professional corporation, the Law Office of R Kent Livesay, PC, over fees from seven client cases. Livesay, who was suspended in January 2017 and had his licence revoked by the Texas Supreme Court on July 6, 2018, had referred personal‑injury cases to Kaster, Lynch, Farrar & Ball, LLP and Farrar & Ball, LLP while he was still licensed. He said he had agreed to share responsibility for representing the clients with the firms.

Livesay notified the firms on December 30, 2016, that he could no longer represent the affected clients. After his licence was revoked, the firms entered into new representation agreements directly with the clients, removing Livesay from the cases. In 2022, Livesay sued the firms seeking payment for the seven matters, alleging breach of contract, quantum meruit, money had and received, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and breach of fiduciary duty, and also sought a declaratory judgment regarding his right to collect fees and expenses.

The firms argued that Livesay had not completed his responsibilities before his licence was suspended and that paying him would violate professional conduct rules and the Texas Supreme Court’s revocation order. In October 2024, they filed a motion for summary judgment, relying partly on an affidavit from Kyle Farrar, a founding partner, that settlement checks had not been issued until after Livesay’s suspension or disbarment. The trial court granted the motion in April 2025 and issued a final judgment in December 2025 in favour of the firms.

Livesay appealed, contending that the firms had not provided sufficient evidence to show that he was legally barred from receiving the fees and expenses. The appellate court noted earlier Texas decisions such as Lee v. Cherry, which allows an attorney who completed the required legal work before suspension or disbarment to recover an agreed referral fee, and Royden v. Ardoin, which bars recovery for unfinished work if disbarment occurs before a contingent‑fee agreement is completed.

The appeals court found that the firms’ affidavit from Farrar was insufficient because it did not establish that Farrar had personal knowledge of when settlement checks were issued. Without that affidavit, the remaining evidence did not conclusively show when the clients received their settlement payments, a key factor in determining whether the cases concluded after Livesay could no longer continue his joint responsibilities. The court also rejected the argument that the Texas Supreme Court’s revocation order automatically prevented Livesay from receiving any payment, explaining that the order does not override Texas law that allows disbarred attorneys to recover fees earned on matters completed while they were licensed.

The November 5 decision reversed the lower court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not determine whether Livesay had completed all his responsibilities or whether the firms owe him the disputed fees or expenses. The ruling gives Livesay another opportunity to pursue his claims, but it does not guarantee that he will recover the fees or expenses he seeks. The case is docketed as 14-25-00393-CV and is available on Justia.