India
India’s Border Standoffs with China Persist Amid Diplomatic Warmth
India’s armed forces are engaged in several ongoing face‑offs with the Chinese army along the border in Arunachal Pradesh, according to Shatrujeet Kapur, director‑general of the Indo‑Tibetan Border Police (ITBP). Kapur’s remarks came nearly four months after local civil‑society groups in the region reported that Chinese forces were increasingly encroaching on Indian territory and denying Indian troops access to patrol points, angering residents.
Chinese President Xi Jinping visited New Delhi last month for the BRICS summit, meeting Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines. The visit marked Xi’s first trip to India in seven years and followed a cautious thaw in bilateral ties, partly driven by the US trade war that has pushed the two nuclear‑armed neighbours closer.
Despite the warm handshakes, tensions along the 3,488‑km border threaten to undermine efforts to normalise relations. The face‑offs in Arunachal Pradesh are said to continue, six years after at least 20 Indian troops were killed in hand‑to‑hand combat with Chinese forces in Ladakh in 2020. Satellite imagery and accounts from the Indian security establishment suggest that China has effectively taken control of parts of the disputed territory since that fight, but the Modi government has refused to concede any land.
Five days after Kapur’s comments, the Indian government had not confirmed the nature of the border tensions, offering only boilerplate criticisms of China. Kapur, speaking at a felicitation ceremony for ITBP personnel, revealed that commandos have been active in the ongoing confrontations.
Arunachal Pradesh’s remote Upper Subansiri region, where the face‑offs are reported, saw the first clash between India and China in August 1959, killing at least two Indian soldiers. The decades‑long dispute stems from the British‑drawn McMahon Line, established in 1914 by the Simla Convention between British India and Tibet. India treats the line as its border, while China rejects it, claiming the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh as “South Tibet” or “Zangnan.” China also controls Aksai Chin, a disputed area of Kashmir.
In 1962, India and China agreed to treat the Line of Actual Control (LAC) as their de‑facto boundary while negotiating broader border differences, but those differences were never resolved, keeping the frontier a flashpoint. The 2020 Galwan Valley clash in Ladakh resulted in at least 20 Indian soldiers killed and four Chinese deaths.
Praveen Donthi, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, said that border tensions amid a thaw in bilateral relations appear to be part of a pattern, likely a pressure tactic by Beijing. He warned that stand‑offs are bound to occur from time to time and some may go out of hand.
The 2020 clash also pushed PM Modi into a domestic corner, as opposition parties questioned the government’s opaque handling of China. The Modi government faced complaints over restrictions on parliamentary scrutiny, questions about intelligence detection of Chinese troop build‑up, and limited disclosure of operational details. Contradictions between the government’s stance and Modi’s claims sparked accusations that he was trying to minimise or hide the scale of the crisis.
On June 17, 2020, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar spoke to his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi, stating that the Chinese side had erected a structure in Galwan Valley on the Indian side of the LAC, which led to violence. Two days later, Modi said on X that “neither has anyone been able to enter our territory, nor is anyone still on our territory,” a statement that disputed the foreign ministry’s account.
Six years since the Ladakh clash, the Chinese incursion has returned to challenge Modi’s strongman image at home, which has already been dented by youth‑led protests that forced out Modi’s education minister in July. Kapur, who is due to retire this week, recalled the 2020 clash and outlined a specialised training programme to better equip personnel for a Ladakh‑like situation. He warned that China’s frontier military capabilities have advanced and that Indian forces may not be able to take a fight head‑on by traditional methods.
The Crisis Group’s Donthi said that the Modi government presents an image of a hard security state with zero tolerance for national security failures, but the power differential with China is sharp, so it tends to downplay any event that reflects poorly.
Bosiram Siram, the top leader of the opposition Congress party in Arunachal Pradesh, said that Chinese troops have intruded nearly 50 km (31 miles) deep into Indian territory in Upper Subansiri. A Siram‑led delegation visited border areas in August after initial reports of incursions and added that “Chinese personnel are stationed up there,” referring to Indian territory. “You can see the Army. They are on top of the mountains, while we are down below,” Siram said.
In response to the ITBP chief’s remarks, India’s foreign ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said that “the situation in India‑China border areas gets disturbed from time to time when Chinese forces diverge from established patrolling patterns.” He did not comment on the ongoing face‑offs.
Professor Deepak, a Chinese studies scholar at Jawaharlal Nehru University, said that the reports of Chinese incursion pose a challenge to Modi’s credibility and accountability. Since 2012, India and China have relied on an official channel that deters border disputes from snowballing, without resolving the underlying question of where their Himalayan boundary lies. The Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India‑China Border Affairs (WMCC) has officials from both countries and operates alongside military channels. Its latest round, the 36th WMCC, was held on August 6, nearly a month after reports of Chinese incursion first emerged in Arunachal Pradesh. In September, a first‑ever commander‑level meeting was held in Arunachal Pradesh.
Deepak said that the continuing face‑offs show that these diplomatic efforts have not eliminated friction. He argued that meetings at the military or local level can provide temporary relief and help prevent escalation, but they cannot, by themselves, deliver a lasting solution to a border dispute rooted in decades of historical, political and strategic differences. In the absence of clear political guidance and a coordinated response in both capitals, any border‑level arrangements will remain fragile and reversible, as seen in Ladakh and now in Upper Subansiri in Arunachal Pradesh.