World
UAE backs Ethiopia while Saudi Arabia remains silent amid Tigray fighting
Addis Ababa – Renewed fighting in Ethiopia’s Tigray region has drawn attention to the positions of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The UAE has publicly supported Ethiopia’s federal government, whereas Saudi Arabia has not issued a statement on the latest hostilities.
On 25 September the UAE condemned attacks by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and allied groups against Ethiopian federal forces, the seizure of airports in Tigray and the escalation in Afar and Amhara. UAE Minister of State Sheikh Shakhboot bin Nahyan Al Nahyan said the UAE stood in solidarity with Ethiopia’s government and people, reaffirmed support for the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for an end to hostilities, protection of civilians and adherence to the Pretoria Agreement signed in November 2022.
The UAE’s public stance is clear: it backs Ethiopia’s federal government while urging de‑escalation and dialogue. The statement does not indicate whether the UAE is providing military assistance or has secured commitments from the parties to end the fighting. The UAE also has commercial interests in the Horn of Africa. Dubai Ports World operates Berbera port in Somaliland, and a shipping route launched in 2025 links Berbera with Jebel Ali in the UAE, creating a corridor for cargo to inland destinations such as Ethiopia. Ethiopia, landlocked since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, relies heavily on Djibouti for access to international trade. These commercial links explain Abu Dhabi’s interest in regional stability and its relationship with Addis Ababa, but they do not prove that the UAE can influence the TPLF, persuade Eritrea to de‑escalate or alter Ethiopia’s military calculations.
Saudi Arabia has not publicly announced its position on the renewed fighting in Tigray. An October 1 analysis by Critical Threats noted that the kingdom had not commented on the latest war. Earlier this year Saudi Arabia undertook diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions between Ethiopia’s federal government and the TPLF. In November 2025 Chatham House reported that sources said Riyadh had offered to mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea amid rising tensions over maritime access and regional security. A June 2026 analysis by Germany’s SWP think tank said previous Saudi mediation efforts had failed, partly because negotiations did not address Ethiopia’s interest in the Eritrean port of Assab.
Saudi Arabia’s broader regional alignment also matters. An August 2026 analysis by the Soufan Center described Saudi Arabia and Egypt as backing Eritrea in opposition to Ethiopia’s ambitions for Red Sea access. This assessment reflects regional alignment, not evidence that Saudi Arabia is directly providing military support to Eritrea or the TPLF in the current fighting.
Saudi Arabia has a strong interest in Red Sea security, a vital corridor for international shipping and its own oil exports. Whether Riyadh will take a more public diplomatic role as tensions rise remains unclear.
Egypt’s rivalry with Ethiopia adds to regional tensions. Egypt’s role in the crisis is shaped by its longstanding dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and its growing ties with Eritrea. Cairo has also stressed that responsibility for the governance and security of the Red Sea rests with countries bordering the waterway, a position shared by Asmara. In September Ethiopia’s army chief, Field Marshal Birhanu Jula, accused Egypt and Sudan of supporting armed groups fighting the federal government, including the TPLF. The allegation, reported by Al Jazeera on 28 September, was not substantiated. Egypt’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Nader Zaki reaffirmed Cairo’s commitment to state sovereignty and non‑interference, rejecting suggestions that it had departed from those principles.
Egypt’s relationship with Eritrea has become an important part of the regional picture. President Abdel Fattah el‑Sisi met Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in Cairo on 8 June 2026. According to Egypt’s presidency, the talks covered bilateral cooperation, developments in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea security. The two leaders also stressed the importance of coordination to maintain regional stability. The meeting highlighted closer cooperation between Cairo and Asmara, but did not establish that either country was involved in the renewed fighting in Tigray.
For Cairo, the dispute with Ethiopia extends beyond Tigray to the Nile and the balance of power in the Horn of Africa. Its relations with Eritrea and its disagreements with Addis Ababa form part of the wider regional context, but they are not evidence of direct Egyptian involvement in the renewed conflict.
The risks extend beyond Tigray. Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access has become a source of tension with Eritrea, whose Red Sea coastline includes the port of Assab. Addis Ababa argues that reliable access to the sea is a national priority while Asmara rejects any threat to its sovereignty. Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of sending troops across the border and supporting armed groups. Eritrea denies the allegations and has called on the United Nations Security Council to intervene. The allegations remain contested, but deteriorating relations have raised the stakes of renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia.
A wider confrontation could put more civilians at risk, complicate humanitarian access and disrupt regional trade and security. It would also test whether external partners could encourage restraint without appearing to endorse either side’s military objectives. The UAE’s close ties with Addis Ababa could provide a channel for diplomatic engagement while Saudi Arabia’s record of regional diplomacy offers a possible opening for renewed talks. However, the available public evidence does not establish that either country is currently leading an initiative to contain the crisis.
The UAE and Saudi Arabia should not be cast as pursuing opposing strategies simply because one has publicly backed Ethiopia’s federal government while the other’s current position is less visible. Their interests and diplomatic approaches differ, but the evidence does not show that either has decisive influence over the fighting. Their contribution should be assessed by whether they can help secure concrete steps toward de‑escalation, renewed political dialogue and a reduction in tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Public statements, commercial interests and past diplomatic achievements may create opportunities for engagement, but they are not substitutes for progress on the ground.
The Pretoria Agreement remains the framework for a political settlement in Tigray, yet renewed fighting underscores the difficulty of sustaining peace while underlying disputes persist. A durable settlement will depend primarily on the parties themselves. External partners could contribute by encouraging restraint and supporting credible negotiations. For now, the UAE’s public alignment with Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic record offer different potential channels for engagement. Whether either country can turn those relationships into a meaningful contribution toward de‑escalation remains unresolved.