World
China Opens Military Training Center in Laos, Expanding Overseas Presence
China has inaugurated a new military training and logistics facility in Laos, extending its security footprint into mainland Southeast Asia. The China‑Laos Joint Support and Training Center at Ban Keun Airport, north of Vientiane, began operations late last month together with the China‑Laos Friendship Aviation Academy. Beijing says the center will mainly train Lao air force pilots and will be jointly maintained and operated by the two countries. The opening adds to China’s relatively small network of overseas military facilities, which includes its first foreign base in Djibouti (2017) and a Chinese‑funded expansion of Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base last year. Laos and Cambodia are considered China’s closest political partners in the region, and military cooperation with both has grown substantially in recent years. The Chinese Defense Ministry stated that the two institutions are not directed against any third party and aim to deepen practical cooperation between the two militaries and contribute to regional peace and stability.
The facility’s infrastructure allows for future expansion of its military use. Hunter Marston, director of the Southeast Asia Program at Australia’s Lowy Institute, told DW that while the focus may be on joint training, Ban Keun could become a more permanent base, giving Beijing political leverage over Vientiane to demand exclusive access. Laos has become heavily dependent on Chinese investment and financing over the past two decades, and critics have accused Beijing of engaging in “debt‑trap diplomacy.” The International Monetary Fund estimated Laos’ public debt at about 81% of GDP last year, with China the largest bilateral creditor. In 2020, China’s state‑owned China Southern Power Grid acquired a reported 90% stake in Electricite du Laos Transmission Company, which operates much of Laos’ electricity transmission network.
A more durable Chinese military presence in Laos would add another dimension to strategic competition between Beijing and Washington in Southeast Asia. The United States still enjoys far more extensive military access across the wider Indo‑Pacific, particularly through alliances with the Philippines, Japan and Australia. Beijing has historically lacked comparable overseas facilities, but Ban Keun, alongside Ream, could gradually reduce that disadvantage by providing additional locations for training, maintenance and potential prepositioning of supplies.
The development is particularly concerning for Vietnam. Euan Graham, a senior fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, told DW that Hanoi and Beijing remain rivals in the South China Sea, where competing territorial claims have generated tensions. Vietnam has traditionally viewed Laos and Cambodia as strategic buffers along its western flank and has worked to maintain influence in both countries. Graham said Vietnam now faces an alarming possibility of strategic encirclement by China and that the new air base in Laos will complicate Vietnam’s defense planning.
Other analysts caution that geography limits Ban Keun’s military value. Collin Koh, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told DW that while China could gradually expand its presence at the facility with more personnel, advisers, instructors, trainer aircraft and eventually more advanced aircraft, the operational usefulness for the PLA’s projection of power in Southeast Asia is constrained by Laos’ landlocked nature. Unlike Ream, Ban Keun provides no sea access, and Chinese military aircraft already operate from larger, better‑equipped bases in southern China. Koh said the site’s geography does not give the Chinese military a significant operational advantage.
Simon Creak, an associate professor at Singapore’s National Institute of Education and a historian of Laos, noted that Vientiane has maintained a policy of non‑alignment since adopting its current foreign policy in 1986. He said Laos has not had similar joint facilities in the past despite close relations with Vietnam, China and Russia, and that any mention of foreign bases in Laos typically recalls the CIA’s bases during the Indochina Wars. Creak believes it is highly unlikely that Laos will adjust its formal foreign policy settings or its longstanding effort to balance relations with Vietnam, Thailand and China.